GETTING DRUNK DRIVERS OFF ILLINOIS
ROADWAYS: ADDRESSING THE SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY REGARDING 911 TIPS &
INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS*
Andrew J. Sheehan**

I. INTRODUCTION
Getting drunk drivers off roadways continues to be a concern for both
law enforcement and unsuspecting motorists throughout the country, and
particularly in Illinois.1 In fact, according to the most recent statistics, deaths
caused by drunk drivers increased 4.6 percent nationwide from 2011 to 2012
and accounted for over 10,300 lost lives.2 Here at home, Illinois was
responsible for the ninth-most drunk driving deaths in 2012, an increase of
15.5 percent from the previous year.3
People all over the country are well aware of the dangers posed by
drunk drivers, and these concerned citizens frequently report such potentially
deadly misconduct to the police by calling 911.4 As many as six states have
tried curbing the devastation caused by drunk drivers by enacting programs
specifically designed to encourage tips calling about suspected drunk drivers,
such as New Mexico’s “Drunkbusters Hotline” and Ohio’s “1-800-GRABDUI” program.5
While these states have taken targeted action through government
initiatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to provide much guidance on
whether a police officer can pull over a suspected drunk driver based solely
on a 911 tip. The inaction of the nation’s highest court, however, has not
prevented a number of local jurisdictions from taking action through their
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own judicial branches.6 In fact, a majority of state courts and at least one
federal circuit court have essentially given police officers the ability to pull
over a suspected drunk driver based solely in response to a 911 caller’s tip.7
These more liberal jurisdictions allow police officers to pull over an alleged
drunk driver without requiring personal observation of the driver swerving
or otherwise engaging in criminal activity, so long as a 911 caller’s allegation
contains some reliable information.8
However, a number of other states—including Illinois—have yet to
fully adopt this open-minded approach, which has left appellate courts,
practicing attorneys, and police officers with a patchwork of authorities
regarding the issue.9 Moreover, the split of authorities continues to fuel the
debate about whether 911 callers reporting drunk drivers are, by themselves,
sufficient to provide police with reasonable suspicion to perform a justifiable
investigatory (or Terry) stop.10
This Comment will argue that the Illinois Supreme Court should adopt
a clear drunk driving standard, which permits police officers—based solely
on a 911 caller’s report of a suspected drunk driver—to assume reasonable
suspicion exists without having to independently verify that the driver
committed a traffic violation or engaged in some other criminal activity. In
other words, this blanket rule would allow all Illinois police officers
responding to a 911 call alleging drunk driving to pull over a suspect without
having to independently observe erratic driving, avoiding a potentially fatal
outcome for the suspected drunk driver and other law-abiding motorists.
Section II of this Comment will provide a brief historical background about
the evolution of the “reasonable suspicion” standard needed for a justifiable
traffic stop by summarizing the Fourth Amendment as well as relevant U.S.
Supreme Court and other federal caselaw. Section III of this Comment will
distinguish and analyze the split of authority among Illinois’ appellate courts
regarding 911 callers alleging drunk driving and the ability of these
complaints to give rise to reasonable suspicion, allowing police to perform a
proper investigatory traffic stop. Section IV of this Comment will analyze
and discuss the justifications and potential problems regarding a blanket
drunk driving exception in Illinois. Finally, Section V of this Comment will
summarize the concepts and emphasize the need for a clear standard, or
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exception, in Illinois with respect to 911 tips alleging drunk drivers and
investigatory Terry stops.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL TREND
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to interpret and
apply the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause while, at the same
time, ensuring its most basic protections are upheld in light of evolving
societal views. The Court has moved away from its per se warrant
requirement for proper searches and seizures towards a more lenient
standard, holding traffic stops may be performed based on reasonable
suspicion, a lesser standard than probable cause.11 While the Court has
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” analysis to determine whether an
anonymous tip is reliable enough to provide reasonable suspicion, the Court
still has yet to explicitly hold whether a reliable tip alone satisfies the
reasonable suspicion threshold required for police to perform a justifiable
Terry stop in alleged drunk driving scenarios.12
In fact, the Court passed on this exact opportunity as recently as five
years ago in Virginia v. Harris.13 The lack of clarity on this issue was evident
in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, where he disagreed with the
Court’s denial of certiorari and noted:
I am not sure that the Fourth Amendment requires such independent
corroboration before the police can act, at least in the special context of
anonymous tips reporting drunk driving. This is an important question that
is not answered by our past decisions, and that has deeply divided federal
and state courts. The Court should grant the petition for certiorari to answer
the question and resolve the conflict.14

A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that all
searches and seizures must be “reasonable.”15 For purposes of this
discussion, the reasonableness requirement is made applicable to the states
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See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
See generally Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268–74 (2000).
See 558 U.S. 978, 978–81 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 978.
The Fourth Amendment provides,
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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through the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Moreover, the Framers of the
Constitution had two main concerns when drafting the Fourth Amendment:
(1) to protect individual privacy and (2) to reign in unrestricted government
activity.17 Thus, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to completely
eliminate all contact between police officers and citizens,18 but rather, to
protect an individual’s privacy from arbitrary invasion by government actors,
such as the police.19
Additionally, the Supreme Court has defined a seizure as “when, by
means of physical force or a show of authority, [a person’s] freedom of
movement is restrained.”20 The Court has further held a seizure only occurs
when “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”21 Also
pertinent to this discussion, the Court has held investigatory traffic stops
conducted by police officers constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment.22
Traditionally, police officers needed a warrant based on probable cause
and issued by a neutral judge or magistrate to justify a constitutional search
or seizure.23 However, because no specific definition of probable cause was
ever articulated by the Court, this standard is based on the totality of the
circumstances, requiring a court to take into account “facts and
circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient . . . to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.”24
The Court, over time, has established a few very limited exceptions to
the per se warrant requirement, such as cases involving hot pursuit, searches
incident to an arrest, and searches of the place where the person is arrested
and places in the suspect’s immediate control.25 The Court has also extended
this exception to brief investigatory traffic stops, known today as Terry stops,
so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the search will
produce evidence of a crime.26
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 820 (1994).
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
See Camara v. Mun. Court & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
Id. at 554.
United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 968 (11th Cir. 2003).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967).
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
James Michael Scears, Anonymous Tips Alleging Drunk Driving: Why “One Free Swerve” Is Too
Many, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 759, 762 (2012).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968).
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B. Terry v. Ohio (1968)
In its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
established a lesser standard permitting police to perform a constitutional
investigatory stop based on a police officer’s observations of potential
criminal activity.27 In Terry, the Court departed from the traditional probable
cause standard and held a police officer could conduct a brief investigatory
stop after an easier-to-meet standard, known as “reasonable suspicion,” was
satisfied.28 Like probable cause, the new standard was based on an officer’s
own observations of “unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.”29
However, the Terry Court defined this new standard as “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.”30
In its decision, the Terry Court held an officer can conduct a brief
seizure and limited search to look for weapons if they observe unusual
conduct that allows them to conclude “criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous.”31 Under this less-demanding standard, the Court now permitted
police officers to seize and search a person more easily without violating the
Fourth Amendment.32
C. Alabama v. White (1990)
Relying on the Gates precedent seven years earlier, which held an
anonymous tip could give rise to probable cause based on the totality of the
circumstances (i.e., accuracy and reliability, and basis of knowledge of the
tipster),33 the Supreme Court in Alabama v. White specifically addressed
whether an anonymous tip could give rise to the less-demanding reasonable
suspicion standard.34
To make this determination, the White Court abided by the elements of
reliability in the Gates totality of the circumstances approach and required
the tip to be sufficiently corroborated, or independently verified, by the police
prior to performing a stop.35 Allowing the tip to be sufficiently and
independently observed by police gave the Court a predictive element, which
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
See id. at 22.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983).
496 U.S. 325, 327–31 (1990).
Id. at 328–31.
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played a major role in its decision to allow investigatory stops based on a
reliable tip.36
In its decision, the White Court determined the tip was reliable because
of its accurate predictions of the suspect’s future behavior, such as arriving
at a specific location carrying a brown case.37 The Court also noted the same
essential factors of the Gates totality of the circumstances analysis were
applicable to the reasonable suspicion context but emphasized that only a
minimal showing of those factors was required to meet this less-demanding
standard.38 Specifically, the White Court held anonymous tips usually
contain three elements to satisfy reasonable suspicion: (1) they are specific
enough so police can conclude it is based on first-hand knowledge; (2) they
are predictive enough of some future behavior of the subject; and (3) they are
able to be corroborated by police.39
After this groundbreaking decision, a number of lower courts began
using the White precedent to uphold investigatory traffic stops based on
anonymous tips when police were only corroborating descriptive details
before the traffic stop.40 This trend was especially pronounced in cases where
anonymous tipsters alleged drunk driving or illegal possession of a firearm. 41
D. Florida v. J.L. (2000)
But just as the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to be greatly diminishing
the level of suspicion required for Terry stops, the Supreme Court in Florida
v. J.L. bucked the trend.42 In its decision, the J.L. Court determined a vague,
anonymous tip did not establish the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for
a brief seizure, or investigatory stop, because it did not contain any predictive
information for police to independently verify and lacked reliability in its
“assertion of illegality.”43 Although this appeared to be a step backwards,
the Court’s suggestive language in dicta suggested something else.44 In dicta,
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 331–32.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 328–29. The Court noted,
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that
reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to
show probable cause.
Id. at 330.
See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 483–84
(2008).
Scears, supra note 25, at 766–67.
Id.
See 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000).
Id. at 272–74.
See generally id. at 273–74.
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the Court opined that other more dangerous or less invasive situations could
arise that could justify getting rid of the reliability typically required in a tip
to conduct a justifiable Terry stop.45
Although the J.L. Court rejected the government’s argument that
firearms were dangerous enough to lessen the reliability requirement under
the totality of the circumstances test, it notably left open the possibility that
other situations could arise that inhibit public safety enough—such as a
person carrying a bomb or in places where a decreased expectation of privacy
exists—where it would be justified to dramatically lower the reliability
required by an anonymous tip.46 In other words, the Court suggested other
more pressing situations could arise that would not necessarily require police
to independently verify a tip to ensure it was reliable.47
A dissenting Chief Justice John Roberts opined that the question of
whether J.L. applied to anonymous tips reporting drunk or erratic driving
remained unsettled, and it was unclear whether the Fourth Amendment
requires “independent corroboration before police can act in a drunk drivinganonymous tip scenario.48 Thus, federal and state courts have been left to
interpret this suggestive language in J.L. and apply it however they see fit.
E. United States v. Wheat (2001)
Focusing on the indicative language in J.L., the United States Eighth
Circuit Court in United States v. Wheat held an anonymous tip alleging a
person was driving erratically was sufficient to give rise to reasonable
suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.49 The court reached its
conclusion despite the fact the police officer did not personally observe the
driver engage in any erratic driving before pulling the vehicle over.50 Instead,
the police officer located the vehicle described by the 911 caller and, soon
thereafter, conducted a Terry stop.51

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 273–74.
In its opinion, the Court in dicta noted,
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which
the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold
that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth
Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports, and schools, cannot conduct
protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.
Id.
See generally id.
Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
278 F.3d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.
See id.
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In its decision, the court noted an erratic driver who is potentially drunk
poses a unique, imminent threat to public safety and, therefore, a lesser
standard of reliability pertaining to the anonymous tip should be permitted,
allowing police to make a justifiable traffic stop.52
The federal circuit court also noted two critical distinctions exist
between the dangers of drunk driving, like in Wheat, and cases involving an
alleged gun possessor, like in J.L.53 First, a police officer responding to an
alleged unlawful possession report may initiate a simple consensual
encounter for which no articulable suspicion is required; but, this is clearly
impossible with a moving vehicle.54 Additionally, a police officer
responding to a tip alleging unlawful possession may quietly observe the
suspect for a longer period of time to watch for other indications of criminal
activity that would give rise to reasonable suspicion; however, alleged drunk
driving scenarios are vitally different.55 In this instance, a police officer has
two choices: (1) intercept the vehicle immediately, or (2) follow and observe
the driver, waiting for an erratic movement, which could result in a
devastating, if not fatal, collision.56
Therefore, due to the imminent danger of drunk driving, the Wheat
Federal Court held a substantial governmental interest exists in effectuating
a traffic stop as quickly as possible in an alleged drunk driving scenario.57
III. ILLINOIS’ SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of whether
independent police verification is required before performing a Terry stop
when responding to 911 tips alleging drunk driving, Illinois has failed to
apply or adopt a consistent approach. Although the Illinois legislature has
essentially codified the Terry decision in its Criminal Code,58 the Court’s
lack of guidance has created a patchwork of authority throughout the state,
leaving police officers, practitioners, and judges with no clear standard to
consistently apply or put into practice.
As noted previously, Illinois’ current split is evident among its appellate
districts. For instance, Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District has adopted a more
liberal approach, which a majority of other states and at least one federal

52.
53.
54.
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58.

Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (1968).
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circuit court have followed.59 The Fourth District has held 911 tips alleging
drunk driving are sufficient by themselves to justify an investigatory stop, so
long as the tip satisfies certain factors indicating its reliability.60 Moreover,
Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District coincides with the Fourth District, which has
held no independent police verification of an anonymous tip is required to
pull over a suspected drunk driver, due to the imminent danger that the
situation poses to the general public.61 This is the same rationale used by the
Fourth District court, too.62
On the other hand, Illinois’ Second Appellate District has taken a more
hardline approach regarding this issue, holding police officers need more
than a just 911 caller’s allegation of drunk driving, such as independent
police verification or a more detailed basis for the tipster’s allegation, to pull
over a driver.63 For example, a tipster’s vague description that they had been
“cut off” by a driver64 or an allegation of a “possible drunk driver” on the
road65 is not sufficient by themselves to justify a Terry stop, due to lack of
reasonable suspicion.66
Thus, a hodgepodge of authority exists throughout the Land of Lincoln,
leaving police officers confused about whether they can pull over a suspected
drunk driver in response to a 911 call without personally observing any
erratic driving.
A. Illinois Criminal Code and Supreme Court
The Illinois legislature has attempted to codify the holding in Terry in
section 107–14 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
A peace officer . . . may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable
period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances
that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an
offense . . . and may demand the name and address of the person and an
explanation of his actions.67

Additionally, the temporary questioning will take place in the vicinity of
where the person or vehicle was stopped.68
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Wheat, 278 F.3d at 729; People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see generally
People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 595–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
See generally Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 595–96.
People v. Stewart, No. 5-10-0264, 2011 WL 10501179, at *2-3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597.
City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U, ¶¶ 6-12.
Id. ¶ 10.
City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 564 N.E.2d 929, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
See, e.g., Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U, ¶ 10; Dugan, 564 N.E.2d at 930.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (1968).
Id.
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Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that police officers
must point to specific, articulable facts to justify a Terry stop that, when
considered under the totality of the circumstances, make the stop
reasonable.69 Further, a Terry stop is not indefinite and can only last as long
as necessary to either confirm or deny the officer’s suspicions that prompted
the investigatory traffic stop.70 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has yet
to rule on the issue of whether independent corroboration of a 911 tip is
needed to give rise to reasonable suspicion in alleged drunk driving
scenarios.
B. Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District
Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District has consistently held 911 callers
alleging drunk driving can, by themselves, give rise to reasonable suspicion
to justify a Terry stop, so long as the tip is reliable.71 A tip’s reliability is
determined by using a four-factor test, which allows a police officer to
reasonably infer the suspected drunk driver is under the influence.72 In other
words, the Fourth District allows police to pull over a suspected drunk driver
without having to personally observe or validate any erratic driving or
criminal activity when responding to a reliable 911 tip.73 The Fourth District
justifies its holding in the fact that an alleged drunk driver poses an imminent
threat to public safety, and therefore, the tip alleging drunk driving requires
less corroboration by police.74
For instance, the court in People v. Shafer held a telephone tip reporting
a drunk driver gave police reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop
without personally observing any traffic violations due to the tip’s reliability
and the imminent public danger posed by the suspected drunk driver.75 In its
decision, Shafer adhered to a four-factor test76 to determine the tip’s
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

People v. Ledesma, 795 N.E.2d 253, 262 (Ill. 2003).
People v. Brown, 798 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 595–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359,
367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 363.
See generally Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 595–96.
Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 366; Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597.
Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 366–67.
The Shafer court employed the four-factor test from a New Hampshire Supreme Court case that
stated:
First, whether there is a ‘sufficient quantity of information’ such as the vehicle’s make,
model, license plate number, location and bearing, and ‘similar innocent details’ so that
the officer may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the one the tipster identified.
Second, the time interval between the police receiving the tip and the police locating the
suspect vehicle. Third, whether the tip is based upon contemporaneous eyewitness
observations. Fourth, whether the tip is sufficiently detailed to permit the reasonable
inference that the tipster has actually witnessed an ongoing motor vehicle offense.
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reliability, which has since been consistently applied in the Second Appellate
District in subsequent caselaw.77 In Shafer, a fast-food employee notified
police that an allegedly intoxicated driver had just ordered food in the drivethru, and the suspected drunk driver was pulled over shortly after leaving the
parking lot.78 The court made mention that less rigorous corroboration of
911 tips is required when it concerns an alleged drunk driver, noting “[an]
informant’s tips regarding possible incidents of drunk driving require less
rigorous corroboration than tips concerning matters presenting less imminent
danger to the public.”79
Similarly, the court in People v. Ewing determined a 911 caller gave
police reasonable suspicion to pull over a suspected drunk driver without
requiring personal verification of erratic driving, based on the four-factor
Shafer test.80 In Ewing, an employee called 911 to report a drunk driver that
had just left her place of business and gave a description of the vehicle,
including its make, model, and license plate.81 After holding the tip was
reliable based in large part on its detailed information, the Ewing court
emphatically distinguished between tips alleging drunk driving and those
reporting other crimes, such as unlawful possession of a firearm.82 Most
notably, the court, like Shafer, determined suspected drunk drivers present a
more imminent danger to other motorists and, therefore, require lesser
corroboration of an informant’s tip.83
C. Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District
Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District also adheres to the Fourth Appellate
District’s liberal approach, holding a reliable tip alone can justify a Terry
stop in drunk driving scenarios because of the danger it poses to the general
public.84
For instance, based on Shafer, the court in People v. Stewart held a
police officer had reasonable suspicion based solely on a 911 caller’s tip and
could therefore conduct a justifiable Terry stop.85 In Stewart, a 911 caller

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004).
Similar to the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s test, the Shafer factors include: (1) the quantity
and detail of the information received to ensure the police are pulling over the suspect described by
the tipster; (2) the time between the tip and the police’s ability to locate the suspect; (3) whether the
tipster’s information was based on eyewitness observations; and (4) whether the tip has sufficient
detail. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 363.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 366.
880 N.E.2d 587, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 595–97.
Id. at 597.
Id.
No. 5-10-0264, 2011 WL 10501179, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
Id. at *2.
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reported a red Ford vehicle with a license plate of “18CU[B]S” was driving
erratically “all over the road.”86 The tipster was following the suspect, giving
the 911 dispatcher updated reports about the vehicle’s location and erratic
driving.87 The police officer responded and, upon locating the vehicle, turned
on his lights and performed a Terry stop.88 Noting informants’ tips regarding
potential incidents of drunk driving “require less rigorous corroboration than
tips concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public,” the
Stewart court concluded the police had reasonable suspicion based solely on
the tip to perform a justifiable Terry stop.89 Particularly, the court determined
a police officer should not have to wait to independently observe erratic
driving in drunk driving scenarios or obtain specific details supporting the
tipster’s conclusion before stopping the vehicle.90
D. Illinois’ Second Appellate District
Illinois’ Second Appellate District has taken a different approach when
determining whether an anonymous tip alone can give rise to reasonable
suspicion in alleged drunk driving cases.91 The Second District’s stricter
approach holds a tip, by itself, is not sufficient to justify an investigatory
traffic stop; instead, the tipster must provide police with other, additional
information that leads them to their conclusion about the motorist’s alleged
intoxicated state.92 In other words, police cannot stop a vehicle based only on
a tipster’s report that a driver is intoxicated because the tipster must provide
a specific basis for the allegation or police must independently verify the
driver’s erratic or drunk driving before making the Terry stop.93
The court in City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley disagreed with the Fourth
District Court’s reasoning in Ewing, which held police are permitted to pull
over a reported drunk driver without questioning the details of a tipster’s
drunk driving allegation.94 In contrast, the Hurley court held a tipster’s
assertion that an intoxicated driver swerved in front of him was not sufficient
to give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.95 In Hurley, a 911
caller reported he was “cut off” in a parking lot by an allegedly-intoxicated
drunk driver; according to the court, this allegation was not enough to permit

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U, ¶ 9.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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police to conduct a justifiable Terry stop because it lacked requisite
reasonable suspicion.96 Although the tip passed the four Shafer factors, the
Hurley court went a step further and held the tipster must provide a basis for
their conclusion, or specific details that led the caller to believe the driver
was intoxicated, in addition to merely providing the tip.97 Thus, the caller’s
allegation that he was “cut off” by a drunk driver was not specific enough to
justify a Terry stop.98
Similarly, the court in Village of Mundelein v. Minx held a tipster’s
description of another driver’s traffic offense was too vague to permit a
justifiable Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion.99 In Minx, a 911 caller
reported another driver was “driving recklessly.”100 The 911 caller never
indicated what observations led him to this conclusion, such as “whether
defendant was speeding, running red lights, weaving between lanes, etc.”101
But, after locating the vehicle, the police officer pulled over the suspected
drunk driver without independently verifying any reckless or erratic
driving.102 Although the 911 tip had some substance of reliability, the Minx
court held it did not satisfy reasonable suspicion based on its lack of detail
and the absence of a police officer’s personal observation of erratic driving—
one of which was needed under the totality of the circumstances.103
Also following this line of authority, the court in City of Lake Forest v.
Dugan held a 911 caller’s report that there was a “possible drunk driver” on
the road did not give police authority to perform a justifiable Terry stop.104
In Dugan, a concerned citizen reported an intoxicated driver had just left a
gas station.105 The caller provided police with the license plate, color, and
make of the driver’s vehicle.106 A few minutes later, a police officer located
the vehicle and followed the driver for some time. 107 But, without
independently verifying anything indicating the driver was intoxicated, the
police officer pulled over the driver and arrested him because he was, not
surprisingly, under the influence of alcohol.108 However, because the
concerned citizen failed to provide any specific facts that supported her
conclusion about the driver’s intoxicated state, the Dugan court held the
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caller failed to sufficiently corroborate the complaint to justify the stop.109
Therefore, the Terry stop was invalidated.110
IV. ANALYSIS
There is little debate about whether drinking and driving is a serious
and potentially deadly dilemma plaguing roadways throughout the
country.111 The only debate is whether police can curb this criminal behavior
by pulling over a suspected drunk driver without independently
corroborating a 911 tip—an important debate that has not been resolved by
either the U.S. Supreme Court or the Illinois Supreme Court.112
The many jurisdictions that permit police to pull over a suspected drunk
driver without personally observing erratic driving or drunken-like behavior
find comfort in a number of justifications.113 The stakes are high, they say,
and the danger is real in these types of scenarios.114 For one, an intoxicated
person behind the wheel poses an imminent danger to the public and the
potential benefits of such a rule outweigh its potential costs or negative
effects.115 Moreover, given the situation, it is impractical to require police to
wait several minutes to independently verify erratic driving because that
period of time could be dangerous or even fatal. Another justification is that
the expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals is diminished on the open
road and the privileges of the Fourth Amendment should therefore also be
somewhat diminished, allowing for police to pull someone over without
having to corroborate a 911 tip.116 And, finally, eyewitness tips alleging
drunk driving have become increasingly reliable, and it is therefore
unnecessary and illogical for police to have to wait for the allegedly
intoxicated driver to commit a traffic violation before pulling them over.117

109. Id. at 931.
110. Id.
111. See Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978–80 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Mich.
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude
of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcoholrelated death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion.”).
112. Harris, 558 U.S. at 979. Compare City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U,
¶¶ 7-9 (holding independent police verification or basis for the caller’s 911 tip was needed in
addition to the allegation itself), with People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(holding a reliable 911 tip, by itself, can give rise to the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a
justifiable Terry stop).
113. See Harris, 558 U.S. at 979.
114. Id.
115. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 365; United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 2001).
116. Harris, 558 U.S. at 978.
117. Id.
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A. Immediate Danger Posed by a Drunk Driver
Arguably the most widely-accepted justification for adopting a drunk
driving exception is the very unique and imminent danger an intoxicated
person behind the wheel poses to the general public.118 As discussed
previously, the majority of Illinois’ appellate courts have recognized that a
drunk driver presents an imminent danger to the public that is more
challenging to thwart successfully by means other than a Terry stop.119
As the Shafer court pointed out, it would be irresponsible for a police
officer, having received a tip alleging drunk driving, to be required to abide
by a wait-and-see approach and merely follow the suspected driver’s car,
waiting for potentially devastating results to occur.120 Additionally,
concerned citizens contacting the police are often a “truly extraordinary” and
selfless, good Samaritan-type occurrence.121 Citizens that overcome their
reluctance to call 911 should be rewarded for their courage because they
report alleged drunk driving out of a sense of protection for the greater
good.122 They are not necessarily looking out for themselves; rather, they are
looking out for others, a virtue to reward—not to ignore.123
Similarly, a number of other state supreme courts have implemented
this rationale in their holdings. For instance, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has held, although no blanket rule exists, extraordinary dangers, such as
drunk driving, sometimes justify extraordinary precautions.124 Likewise, the
New Jersey Supreme Court mentioned intoxicated drivers, which it referred
to as “moving time bombs,” pose a significant risk to themselves as well as
the public and these types of situations therefore warrant a lesser degree of
police corroboration.125
Additionally, the dangers in drunk driving scenarios are heightened
compared to dangers in other situations, such as an alleged firearm or drug
possession, which require greater Fourth Amendment protections.126 For
instance, courts find extraordinary danger in “a vehicle’s mobility; the
unpredictability of a driver’s actions; the observable nature of erratic driving
. . . and a lack of alternatives for police investigation of drunk driving.”127
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An anonymous report of erratic or drunk driving presents a greater need for
prompt action by police.128
Furthermore, the options police officers have are extremely limited
when responding to a 911 tip in these situations.129 For instance, an officer
can either pull over the suspected drunk driver immediately to check if the
driver is under the influence of alcohol, avoiding a potentially dangerous
situation, or an officer can take a hands-off approach and quietly follow the
driver, waiting for the driver to swerve or commit another traffic violation.130
Choosing the latter will undoubtedly result in one of three outcomes: (1) the
suspected drunk driver will continue down the road and make it safely to his
destination; (2) the suspected drunk driver will mindlessly weave in-and-out
of traffic lanes, injuring nobody, but nonetheless corroborating the
informant’s tip and justifying a Terry stop; or (3) the suspected drunk driver
will swerve into oncoming traffic or fail to stop at a red light at a busy
intersection, slamming into another vehicle and killing any number of
unsuspecting motorists.131
As Chief Justice John Roberts noted in Virginia v. Harris, consider the
sheer difficultly for a police officer to explain to a grieving family that,
although police knew through a 911 tip that the driver of the car that swerved
into their son’s or father’s lane was intoxicated, “they were powerless to pull
him over, even for a quick check” because of the wait-and-see mandate.132
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in J.L. refused to speculate explicitly
about which types of dangerous circumstances would justify a drunk driving
exception, the Court did in fact hypothesize in dicta that a 911 report of a
“person carrying a bomb” did not need to have the same indicia of reliability
that is required in less dangerous scenarios before police can constitutionally
conduct a seizure.133
Similarly, the Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District in Schafer agreed with
the Court’s “ticking time bomb” analysis, stating intoxicated drivers are
indeed “moving time bombs.”134 It therefore follows that intoxicated drivers
behind the wheel are uniquely dangerous to the general public and these
situations should not require the same level of corroboration other scenarios
do.135
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B. Reliability of and Potential Abuse by Tipsters
Further, many jurisdictions, including the majority of Illinois’ appellate
districts, consider 911 tips alleging drunk drivers much more reliable than
anonymous tips alleging other criminal activity, such as illegal possession of
drugs or firearms.136 Unlike tips alleging a person has a firearm, where a
predictive element may be the only way police can corroborate the tipster’s
knowledge, the tip in drunk driving cases almost always comes from
eyewitness observations, which inherently increases the tip’s reliability.137
Although many critics of a drunk driving exception argue it could be
abused in petty ways by feuding neighbors or family members, ultimately
wasting the police department’s time, this argument is an exaggerated one.
Specifically, “[g]iven the intricacies and improbabilities that would be
involved in seeking to harass another by a report of reckless or erratic driving,
it seems highly unlikely that such a report will have been fabricated for that
purpose.”138
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently clarified this point
regarding 911 calls and their reliability. The Court stated:
The recorded call and its subsequent transcript show both the caller’s basis
of information and the caller’s reliability. The fact that the police agency
either knew the identity of the caller or had the means to discover the
caller’s identity enhances the caller’s credibility. The police were in a
position to go back to their source. If the information provided had turned
out to be untrue, the police would have been able to follow up and confront
the caller, demand an explanation, and pursue criminal charges. 139

Therefore, the risk of feuding citizens abusing the drunk driving
exception is relatively low. Even if the critics’ fears were to come true, the
possibility of that abuse happening is most certainly outweighed by the
strong government interest in getting drunk drivers off the road as soon as
possible.140
Along those same lines, 911 tips can no longer be considered truly
“anonymous,” which greatly increases a 911 tip’s reliability and decreases
the likelihood for potential abuse or harassment.141 By calling 911, the tipster
puts their anonymity at risk, which increases the tip’s reliability.142 In other
136.
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words, tipsters who call 911 are more reliable compared to anonymous
informants who mail a letter to police with no return address because their
phone numbers can be easily traced seconds after making initial contact with
the 911 dispatcher.143 Caller identification systems with the ability to track
phone numbers are widely available and currently used by law enforcement
agencies across Illinois. So, “if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and
distracting to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the location of
the telephone used by the informant” and police can arrest the phony caller.144
In other words, tipsters’ reports to 911 have a greater degree of reliability
than anonymous tips and require less corroboration.145
Moreover, some critics may further argue a tipster can use the same
advances in technology to block the police from tracking the location of their
call, but this argument is also misplaced because the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) rules eliminate this from the realm of
possibilities.146 In fact, the same FCC rules that allow someone to block their
number from another person’s caller identification service by dialing *67
actually prohibit this same action for calls seeking emergency assistance,
such as 911.147 Thus, even when a person dials *67 before dialing 911, the
phone number will still be seen and available to the emergency dispatcher on
the other end of the call, and police will be able to track the phone number’s
location.148 The same is true for cellular phones, as the FCC rules require
service providers to have the ability to pinpoint the location of all cell phones
that dial 911, which allows police to respond and assist the caller
immediately.149
C. Lesser Expectation of Privacy on the Road
Another justification for courts that permit investigatory traffic stops in
these situations is the fact that a driver enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy
in a vehicle on the open road.150 Thus, because an investigatory traffic stop
on the road is less invasive than a typical Fourth Amendment search and
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seizure, a lesser standard of reliability should be required for tips to meet the
constitutional reasonableness requirements.151
Although a driver does not lose all reasonable expectations of privacy
in an automobile, the Illinois Supreme Court has held a driver’s expectation
of privacy is greatly diminished because the vehicle and its use are subject to
various Illinois regulations.152 For instance, in Illinois, a driver must meet a
number of requirements, including obtaining a valid driver’s license by
passing vision and written examinations, acquiring appropriate vehicle
insurance, having current vehicle registration, title, tag, and license plate, and
wearing a seatbelt, among others.153 Regulations in Illinois, such as these,
have led the U.S. Supreme Court to hold a person has a lesser expectation of
privacy when they are behind the wheel.154
The Supreme Court in J.L. similarly noted that areas where a person has
a lesser expectation of privacy, such as airports and schools, do not warrant
the type of corroboration, or independent verification, traditionally needed
for justifiable searches compared to other areas where a person has a stronger
sense of privacy.155 In fact, while driving on the open road, a person expects
a lesser level of privacy than one expects within the walls of their
residence.156
Further, some proponents of the drunk driving exception have
analogized an investigatory traffic stop to that of a roadside sobriety
checkpoint, which does not require any police corroboration before briefly
questioning the driver.157 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in this context, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile
and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”158
To justify sobriety checkpoints, the U.S. Supreme Court held
individuals driving on public roads enjoy a lower expectation of privacy
while on those open thoroughfares.159 It follows that this lower expectation
of privacy diminishes the constitutional safeguards put in place by the Fourth
Amendment, which further justifies the need to institute a policy that allows
police to immediately pull over suspected drivers without corroboration.
Additionally, by balancing the government intrusiveness of a traffic
stop with the government’s strong interest in shielding citizens from the
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potentially-devastating effects of drunk driving, traffic stops are the only
reasonable method available to police officers to protect this compelling
interest.160
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, a number of justifications suggest why the Illinois Supreme
Court should adopt a “drunk driving exception,” allowing police officers to
assume reasonable suspicion exists based solely on a 911 caller’s report of
an intoxicated driver without having to independently view a traffic violation
or otherwise observe other criminal activity.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve this question, it
appears quite evident that the Court throughout the years has given police
more leniency to perform Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. This is
evident in the Court’s shift from the per se warrant requirement towards the
less-demanding probable cause standard, and now to today’s approach,
which holds Terry stops can be conducted based solely on reasonable
suspicion, an even lesser standard than probable cause.
Additionally, due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s inaction, Illinois
appellate courts, attorneys, and police officers are left with a patchwork of
authority throughout the state. Although two of Illinois’ appellate districts
have apparently put into place this drunk driving exception, a blanket rule
requiring all jurisdictions to adopt this approach would bring stability and
eliminate the confusing split of authority in Illinois.
Finally, a number of justifications relied upon by the courts that already
adopt this approach suggest applying this exception in Illinois is not only
constitutional, but sensible. Drunk driving poses a unique risk to the general
public and, therefore, requiring a wait-and-see approach or independent
corroboration of 911 tips is impractical and potentially devastating.
Moreover, 911 tips have become increasingly reliable, and independent
police corroboration is unnecessary and downright burdensome, given the
advances in technology—particularly with regard to identifying 911 callers.
The risk of potential abuse or harassment under this exception is also
overstated. Finally, persons enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy driving on
public roads and the requirements needed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment
should therefore also be diminished.
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